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21. Introduction
We consider stable communication in a cheap-talk game and provide a new criterion,
suggestive domination, for comparison of equilibria. This research is based on Blume and
Sobel [2]. They provided a refinement concept of equilibrium in the cheap-talk game, by
utilizing the idea of stability in the sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern [7], and reached
the existence result of their concept. While their concept brought a new viewpoint of sta-
bility in equilibrium refinement of a cheap-talk game, the formulation has certain weak-
nesses. This paper tries to improve them by modifying the formulation of Blume and
Sobel. We will directly define an equilibrium concept without referring to von Neumann-
Morgenstern’s stability. Also, our new concept keeps the spirit of Blume and Sobel as well
as the existence result.
First, we will give a brief summary of the cheap-talk game and of the approach of Blume
and Sobel [2]. Second, we will talk about the weaknesses involved in their approach, and
then will talk about our modification of their concept.
The cheap-talk game is a signaling game with cheap communication between an in-
formed player (Sender) and an uninformed player (Receiver). As the Sender’s type is
known only to himself, he sends a message of his type to the Receiver and she chooses her
action after receiving it. The cheap communication means that the players’ payoff func-
tions are independent of the message and, therefore, the standard refinement concepts as
sequential equilibrium do not refine equilibria in cheap-talk games.1
Blume and Sobel [2] presented a new refinement of equilibrium for the cheap-talk game
and succeeded in refining equilibria. Their equilibrium concept captures stable commu-
nication by adopting the concept of von Neumann-Morgenstern’s stable set.2 The stable
communication means that an ‘additional communication’ would not disrupt equilibrium,
i.e., neither the Sender nor Receiver would have an incentive to change their behavior pat-
terns even if the Sender had another chance to communicate with the Receiver. Blume and
Sobel introduced the CP-trumping relation and classified all reasonable communication
patterns by the CP-trumping relation. The classifications are good agreements and bad
agreements. Then they defined a communication-proof equilibrium to be a good agreement
where the Receiver’s belief is the same as the prior.
Blume and Sobel interpreted their equilibrium concept as the meaning that the equi-
librium is stable in additional communication and brought a new viewpoint of stability in
the cheap-talk game. Nevertheless the communication-proof equilibrium still seem to be
1See Farrell [3].
2Among others, Farrell [3] and Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite [4] also consider the refine-
ment of equilibrium in a cheap-talk game. However, in contrast to our paper as well as Blume and Sobel,
their approach focuses not on the stability in additional communication, but on ex-ante decision-making.
3unstable and unreasonable because the equilibrium is defined by the partial adoption of
the stability concept of von Neumann-Morgenstern, and because the belief the Receiver
has may be incoherent for the Sender’s mixed strategies. We now explain these two points
briefly and will also discuss the details in Subsection 2.3.
In Blume and Sobel’s approach, the Receiver has a prior belief over the Sender’s type and
may revise the prior after receiving a message. However, while the set of all the good agree-
ments is the similar notion to von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, the communication-
proof equilibrium is not all good agreements, but a subset of good agreements. This is
the partial adoption of von Neumann-Morgenstern’s stable set and one unstable factor in
their approach. This is because a communication-proof equilibrium may be CP-trumped
by a bad agreement and another good agreement CP-trumping the bad agreement may
not be a communication-proof equilibrium.
The incoherency of the Receiver’s belief is related with randomized strategies in Au-
mann [1]. He regards mixed strategies as random variables in the pure strategy space.
When the Receiver revises the prior in Blume-Sobel’s formulation, any message by the
Sender should be regarded as such a random variable. This is because she observes only a
realized message and revises the prior by the message. Then, the Sender may not follow
the randomization of his mixed strategy because his randomized strategies, per sa, are
private information and the payoffs are independent of messages. Therefore we need to
consider the coherency between Receiver’s belief and Sender’s mixed strategies.
These two problems are exemplified in Subsection 2.3. Our example will indicate
an instable communication-proof equilibrium involved by the partial adoption of stable
set concept and the incoherency of the Receiver’s belief. Our equilibrium concept, sug-
gestive dominant equilibrium, will be proposed as a different behavior pattern from the
communication-proof equilibrium and will eliminate these two instable factors. Our main
theorem shows the existence of the equilibrium. As seen in the proof of Main theorem,
we will show how to construct our equilibrium based on both good and bad agreements of
Blume and Sobel. This construction is the process to find a stable communication pattern
without referring to a stable set.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section we provide the basic model of
cheap-talk games, and show the CP-trumping relations by Blume and Sobel [2] and the
R-trumping relation provided by a referee of their paper. Moreover we exemplify the
unstable and unreasonable factors of the two trumping relations and equilibria, and make
our motivation clear by the example. In Section 3, we present a new refinement concept,
the suggestive domination. The first subsection in this section gives our main theorem
and the second one discusses the difference between Blume-Sobel’s and ours. The last
subsection shows that the suggestive domination yields the Pareto improvement. Finally
4we will give final comments in the last section. The proof of our main theorem, the
existence of our equilibrium, is given in the Appendix.
2. Cheap-Talk Games and Trumping Relations
This section provides the basic notions of the cheap-talk game. The formulation in
our paper is due to Blume and Sobel [2]. After giving the formulation of the cheap-talk
game, we explain two relations, the CP-trumping and R-trumping relations, in Blume and
Sobel’s paper. The last subsection discusses the weakness of Blume-Sobel’s equilibrium
with respect to stable communication.
2.1. Basic Notions. We consider the cheap-talk game G = 〈{S,R}, (T, pi), A, M, uS , uR〉.
Each component is as follows: The set {S,R} consists of the Sender S and the Receiver
R. Let T be a set of a finite number of possible types for S and let A be the finite set of
actions available to R. We denote a probability distribution on T by pi, and assume that
pi(t) > 0 for any t ∈ T . In G, the Sender privately knows his own type t ∈ T and sends a
message to the Receiver. We denote, by M , the set of messages for S. The cardinality of
M is assumed that |M | ≥ 2 ·2|T |, where |X| is the cardinality of a set X. This assumption
guarantees to send a different message for any subset of T .3 In G, the payoffs of the
players are independent of the Sender’s messages, in which sense his messages are cheap.
The payoff function of each player i ∈ {S,R} is given by ui : A× T → R.
The game G proceeds as follows: A type t ∈ T for S occurs with probability pi(t). The
Sender S observes the type t and then sends the message to the Receiver R. The strategy
for the Sender is given by σ : T → ∆(M), where we denote the set of probabilities on a
set X by ∆(X) . We denote the marginal distribution over M upon t ∈ T by σ(·|t). After
the Receiver R obtains the message available to the Sender, she chooses her own action
a ∈ A. The strategy for the Receiver is given by α : M → ∆(A). Also, we denote the
marginal over A upon m ∈M by α(·|m). Finally both two players would get their payoffs
depending on both the S’s type and R’s action.
Given a strategy pair (σ, α), the expected payoffs of S at type t and of R are respectively
given as follows:
US(σ, α| t) :=
∑
m∈M
∑
a∈A
σ(m|t)α(a|m)uS(a, t) for each t ∈ T ; (1)
UR(σ, α) :=
∑
t∈T
pi(t)
∑
m∈M
∑
a∈A
σ(m|t)α(a|m)uR(a, t). (2)
3In the literature of cheap-talk games, it is usually assumed that |M | ≥ 2|T |. The reason we require
|M | ≥ 2 · 2|T | is technical. The detail will be made clear in our proof of Main theorem.
5The strategy pair (σ, α) is called a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a cheap-talk game G if
the following conditions satisfy;
if σ(m|t) > 0,
∑
a∈A
α(a|m)uS(a, t) ≥
∑
a∈A
α(a|m′)uS(a, t) for all m′ ∈M ;
if α(a|m) > 0,
∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ(m|t)uR(a, t) ≥
∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ(m|t)uR(a′, t) for all a′ ∈ A.
The second condition does not restrict on α(·|m) if σ(m|t) = 0. Therefore we require that,
for m ∈M with∑t∈T σ(m|t)pi(t) = 0, α(·|m) must be an optimal response to some belief.
When a Bayesian Nash equilibrium satisfies this condition, we call it a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.4
Since the R’s expected payoff depends on pi, R’s belief has an influence on her decision
in G. Blume and Sobel [2] considered a situation that the Receiver revises her prior pi
following a message of σ. For the consideration of her revised belief, we define the game
given p by the game where pi in G is replaced with the probability distribution p. As
formulated later, this p means the Receiver’s revised belief. If the Sender had the chance
of an additional communication, both the players would face the game given p. The
stability by Blume and Sobel is considered by this game given p as well as pi. Then (σ, α)
is called an equilibrium given p if (σ, α) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for pi(·) ≡ p(·).
2.2. Agreements and CP-trumping relation. Blume and Sobel regarded the refine-
ment of the equilibria in the cheap-talk game as a stable consequence of our languages.
Therefore they tried, by their equilibrium, to capture that neither the Sender nor Re-
ceiver would have an incentive to change their behavior patterns even if the Sender had an
additional chance to communicate with the Receiver. For the stability in additional com-
munication, their refinement concept adopts the idea of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
stable set.
Blume and Sobel introduced a set of agreements and a trumping relation on them.
An agreement is defined as a triple of the form A = (σ, α, p), where p is a probability
distribution over T and (σ, α) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the game given p.
Then they introduced the following relation concept.
Definition 2.1. (σ, α, p) is CP-trumped by (σ′, α′, p′) at m∗ if and only if there exists a
message m∗ such that
(i) there exists t′ such that p(t′)σ(m∗|t′) > 0, and for all t ∈ T ,
p′(t) =
p(t)σ(m∗|t)∑
s∈T p(s)σ(m∗|s)
; (3)
(ii) for all t ∈ T with σ(m∗|t) > 0, US(σ, α| t) < US(σ′, α′| t).
4Blume and Sobel [2] refer it as a sequential equilibrium.
6In this definition, Blume and Sobel capture the additional communication. Indeed,
Condition (i) means that, after receiving m∗, the Receiver’s belief is changed to p′ in an
additional communication. As a result, both the players would face the game given p′.
Condition (ii) means (σ′, α′) could be an equilibrium in an additional communication,
which yields the higher payoff for the Sender by using m∗. Then they define that the
previous agreement (σ, α, p) is CP-trumped by the new agreement (σ′, α′, p′).
By the trumping relation, they partition the set of agreements. This partition is truly
reflecting the concept of von Neumann–Morgenstern the stable set. Here we give a general
definition of a partition without restriction on the CP-trumping relation.
Definition 2.2. {G,B} is a consistent partition of the set of agreements relative to a
trumping relation if and only if
• every agreement in G is trumped only by agreements in B;
• every agreement in B is trumped by some agreement in G.
For a consistent partition {G,B}, we call the elements in G good agreements and those
in B bad agreements relative to the trumping relation, respectively. For the CP-trumping
relation, a unique consistent partition is guaranteed (Blume and Sobel [2, Proposition 1,
p. 366]). Then they defined the following equilibrium with the consistent partition.
Definition 2.3. An equilibrium (σ, α) is communication-proof if and only if (σ, α;pi) is a
good agreement relative to the CP-trumping relation.
The existence of communication-proof equilibria is also guaranteed by Proposition 2
in Blume and Sobel [2, p. 368]. While the CP-trumping relation enables to refine the
equilibria in cheap-talk games, we have a doubt that the Receiver believes the message
credible. Indeed, Condition (ii) doesn’t restrict on US(·| t) if type t doesn’t send the
messagem∗ i.e., σ(m∗| t) = 0. This fact has been pointed out by a referee of Blume-Sobel’s
paper. The referee has suggested appending the following condition to the definition of
the CP-trumping relation:
(iii) For all t ∈ T with σ(m∗|t) = 0,
US(σ, α| t) ≥ max
mˆ∈M
∑
a∈A
α′(a|mˆ)uS(a, t) (4)
Condition (iii) guarantees that the types who don’t send m∗ cannot get higher payoff.
These conditions, (ii) and (iii), can be taken for ‘credibility’ in the sense that they don’t
have any incentive to tell a lie on his types. Blume and Sobel call the trumping relation sat-
isfying (i), (ii), and (iii) the R-trumping relation. Then the R-proof equilibrium is defined
as the good agreements relative to the R-trumping relation as well as the communication-
proof equilibrium.
7a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
t1 (1, 1) (0, 0) (-1, 3) (3, 2) (2, -2)
t2 (1, 1) (1, 5) (-1, -7) (2, 0) (2, 0)
t3 (1, 1) (0, 0) (-1, 3) (2, -2) (3, 2)
t4 (0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0)
Table 1
Nevertheless we still doubt that the Receiver believes the credibility of the messages.
In the following, we exemplify the reason and propose the new refinement criterion in the
cheap-talk game.
2.3. An Example. In order to understand Blume-Sobel’s concepts and our motivation,
we consider the following cheap-talk game G := 〈{S,R}, (T, pi), A, M, uS , uR〉, where T
consists of four types, t1, t2, t3, t4, pi(t) = 1/4 for each t ∈ T , A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5},
M = {m1,m2,m3,m4,m5,m6,m7}, and the players’ payoffs are given as Table 1.5 The
left number in each parenthesis is the Sender’s payoff and the right one is the Receiver’s
in the table.
Then we have three Bayesian Nash equilibria E1 = (σ1, α1), E2 = (σ2, α2), E3 = (σ3, α3)
as follows: The first equilibrium E1 is a pooling equilibrium, i.e. σ1(m1| t) = 1 for all t ∈ T
and α1(a2| m) = 1 for all m ∈M . The second equilibrium E2 consists of σ2(m2|t) = 1 for
t = t1, t2, t3, σ2(m3|t4) = 1, α2(a2|m) = 1 for m = m1,m2, and α2(a3|m) = 1 otherwise.
The third Bayesian Nash equilibrium E3 is given as follows:
σ3(m|t) =

σ3(m4|t) = 1 if t = t1, t3
σ3(m4|t) = σ3(m5|t) = 12 if t = t2
σ3(m3|t) = 1 if t = t4
α3(a|m) =

α3(a3|m) = 1 if m = m3
α3(a2|m) = 1 if m = m5
α3(a1|m) = 1 otherwise.
5In this example, it does not matter that the cardinality of M is less that 2 · 2|T |.
8The equilibrium E3 is CP/R-trumped by the following agreement Aˆ = (σˆ, αˆ, pˆ) at the
message m4:
σˆ(m| t) =

σˆ(m6| t) = 1 if t = t1
σˆ(m6| t) = σˆ(m7| t) = 1/2 if t = t2
σˆ(m7| t) = 1 if t = t3
σˆ(m3| t) = 1 if t = t4;
αˆ(a| m) =

αˆ(a4| m) = 1 if m = m6
αˆ(a5| m) = 1 if m = m7
αˆ(a3| m) = 1 otherwise;
pˆ(t) =

2/5 if t = t1, t3
1/5 if t = t2
0 if t = t4
Since Aˆ yields the highest payoff to the Sender, it is a good agreement. Then E3 is a bad
agreement because it is trumped by Aˆ at m4. As either E1 or E2 is not CP/R-trumped
by any agreements, these two are communication/R-proof equilibria in this game. It is,
however, doubtful that these equilibria are stable while E3 is neither communication-proof
nor R-proof equilibrium. Because, when the Sender gets to know his type as t1 or t3, he
must prefer the agreement E3. Indeed, at the types t1, t3, the Sender gets the payoff 1 in
E3 while he gets 0 in E1 and E2.
This problem arises from (a) the partial adoption of the concept of the stable set and
(b) the inconsistency between the revised beliefs and randomized strategies. The partial
adoption in (a) means that communication/R-proof equilibria are defined as a subset of
good agreements, i.e., the good agreements with p = pi. The stability in a stable set makes
sense when considering all the elements in the good agreements. This is because, even if
some good agreement is trumped by a bad agreement, the bad agreement is trumped by
another good agreement. That is, the external stability can be kept by the all the elements
in a stable set.
Nevertheless, the perfect Nash equilibrium given pi may be CP/R-trumped by the good
agreement given p which is not communication/R-proof equilibrium. In the above example,
E3 is CP/R-trumped by the good agreement Aˆ at m4 and the agreement Aˆ is not a
communication/R-proof equilibrium. As a result, though E3 yields the higher payoff than
E1, E2 at some types, it is not equilibrium in the Blume-Sobel’s sense, i.e., the stability of
agreements are not sustained.
Furthermore, by (b), we point out an unreasonable aspect of the trumping relations.
In the cheap-talk game, the distribution σ(·|t) for each t ∈ T does not matter because
the payoffs are independent of Sender’s messages of S. If anything, the matter is that
9the Sender surely uses the message m with σ(m|t) > 0 for each t ∈ T . Nevertheless, the
condition (i) of the trumping relations is given following the distribution of σ without
any restriction. Since Sender’s randomized strategies are private information, it is not
guaranteed in the cheap-talk game that the Sender follows σ. As a result, it may be
unreasonable that the belief is revised following σ.
Look at the agreements E3 and Aˆ in the example. While the Sender follows σ3(m4|t2) =
σ3(m5|t2) = 1/2 at t2 in E3, E3 is CP/R-trumped by Aˆ at m4 but not at m5. In this
situation, the trumping relations mean that the Sender has an incentive to follow Aˆ in
an additional communication. However, is that really the valid consequence? The answer
must be negative for the following reason.
Let us take notice of the Sender’s strategy at t2 in E3. He chooses each action m4,m5 at
t2 with probability 1/2. As considered by the trumping relations, m4 yields an additional
communication following Aˆ and m5 does not. Then it is natural that the Sender at t2
sends m4 rather than m5, i.e., he naturally deviates from σ3. This is because he expects
to obtain the higher payoff in the additional communication.
Furthermore, consider the Receiver’s revised belief pˆ in in Aˆ. By the condition (i) of the
trumping relations, it must be constructed by σ3(m4|·) in the additional communication.
However, as mentioned above, the Sender does not have any incentive to follow σ3. As a
result, Aˆ isn’t valid for the additional communication.
These two problems are the peculiar ones to cheap-talk games. In the following section,
we provide a new refinement concept to solve these problems. For the consideration of
valid additional communication, we need a stronger condition and solve the problems due
to the consistent partition.
3. Suggestive Dominant Equilibrium
This section presents a new concept of suggestive dominant equilibrium. This equilib-
rium chooses the maximal element in the set of agreements in the sense of payoffs. Then
we do not need the consistent partition and, as a result, we can avoid the unstable factors
mentioned above.
In the first subsection, we define the suggestive dominant equilibrium and show the its
existence as the main theorem. After that, we discuss the meanings of the definition in
the subsequent subsection.
3.1. Suggestive Domination. We now define dominated agreements as follows:
Definition 3.1. An agreement A = (σ, α, p) is suggestively dominated (S-dominated)
by another agreement A′ = (σ′, α′, p′) in M∗ if and only if there exists a nonempty set
M∗ ⊆M such that, for each m∗ ∈M∗,
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(I) there exists t′ ∈ T such that p(t′)σ(m∗|t′) > 0 and for all t ∈ T ,
p′(t) =
p(t)σ(m∗|t)∑
s∈T p(s)σ(m∗|s)
;
(II) for all t ∈ T with σ(m∗|t) > 0, US(σ, α| t) ≤ US(σ′, α′| t), and the inequality is
strictly held for at least one type;
(III) for all t ∈ T with ∑m∗∈M∗ σ(m∗|t) < 1 and for all mˆ ∈M ,
US(σ, α| t) ≥
∑
a∈A
α′(a|mˆ)uS(a, t).
In this domination, the Sender has the incentive to behave on the dominating agreement
A′ because his expected payoff is greater than A at least one type. In addition, A′ is
credible for the Receiver because S’s expected payoff can not be higher than that in A at
the randomized strategies. As shown in later Proposition 3.4, the Receiver will also follow
the agreement A′ so that R’s expected utility is improved by A′. This is the reason we use
the term ‘suggestive,’ i.e., the Sender suggests the better action plan by this domination.
This definition differs from the R-trumping relation in the following three points: First,
the suggestive domination is defined not by a single message but by a set of messages
M∗. Second, we require the strict inequality not for all the types but for at least one
type in (II). Third, we impose the same condition as (4) of the R-trumping relation on
all the randomized strategies as well as the zero-probability strategy of the Sender. The
significance of these differences is discussed in the following subsection. We now define
the equilibrium of the suggestive domination.
Definition 3.2. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium (σ, α) is a suggestive dominant equilibrium
if (σ, α, pi) is not S-dominated by any agreement.
In contrast to both the communication-proof and R-proof equilibria, the suggestive
dominant equilibrium chooses the maximal elements of all the agreements. By considering
the maximal elements, we can exclude the unstable messages and unreasonable beliefs in
an additional communication. Our main theorem guarantees the existence of an suggestive
dominant equilibrium as follows:
Theorem 3.3. There exists a suggestive dominant equilibrium in any chap-talk game.
We will show the formal proof of Main theorem in Appendix. So we here give a sketch
of the proof for the theorem. The proof is constructive and so we can find the suggestive
dominant equilibrium by the construction. This construction is also used in Proposition 3.4
later.
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Now suppose that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium A := (σ, α, pi) is S-dominated by A′ =
(σ′, α′, p′) atM∗. We denote the set of messages used with positive probabilities byM(σ˜, p˜)
for a profile (σ˜, α˜, p˜), i.e., M(σ˜, p˜) := {m ∈ M | ∑t∈T p˜(t)σ˜(m|t) > 0}. Then we suppose
M(σ, pi) ∩M(σ′, p′) = ∅. Note that this assumption does not lose the generality because
of the assumption |M | ≥ 2 · 2|T |. Indeed the Sender can use two different messages for
each subset of T . The reason we require |M | ≥ 2 · 2|T | is for construction of two different
message profiles for each subset of T .
Let us construct another agreement A∗ by using both A and A′. We consider the other
pair of probability distributions A∗ = (σ∗, α∗, pi) constructed as follows: For each t ∈ T ,
σ∗(m| t) =

σ′(m| t)
∑
m∗∈M∗
σ(m∗| t) if m ∈M(σ′, p′)
0 if m ∈M∗
σ(m| t) otherwise;
α∗(m) =
{
α′(m) if m ∈M(σ′, p′)
α(m) otherwise.
First we prove that A∗ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and second that A∗ is not S-
dominated by A′. If A∗ is S-dominated by another agreement, we repeat the construction
of an agreement. Finally we show that the repetitive construction is completed in the
finite steps. ¤
3.2. Discussion on the Suggestive Domination. As pointed out by Example 2.3,
there are some weaknesses in communication/R-proof equilibrium: (a) The partial adop-
tion of the stable set (b) The incoherency between the Receiver’s revised beliefs and the
Sender’s mixed strategies. Our definition of the suggestive domination has been given to
make up them.
Remember that the difference between the CP/R-trumping relation and S-domination:
(1) The S-domination is defined by the set of messages;
(2) The strict inequality in (ii) of the S-domination is imposed not on all the types
but on at least one type;
(3) The condition in (iii) of the S-domination is imposed on all the randomized strate-
gies.
As the differences (1) and (2) are due to (3), we first explain (3).
In the following discussion, we call the elements of M∗ in Definition 3.1 dominated
messages. Then we classify the Sender’s types into three groups by his strategy σ(·|t) of
dominated agreements:
Dominated types:
∑
m∗∈M∗ σ(m
∗|t) = 1, i.e., the Sender at this type uses only
dominated messages.
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Medium types: 0 <
∑
m∗∈M∗ σ(m
∗|t) < 1, i.e., he uses both dominated and other
messages at this type.
Non-Dominated types:
∑
m∗∈M∗ σ(m
∗|t) = 0, i.e., he uses no dominated mes-
sages at this type.
The difference (3) avoids the incoherence between the beliefs and randomized strategies.
Indeed Condition (III) requires the equal expected payoff for the Sender in Medium types
in combination with Condition (II). As a result, even if he acts on a different distribution
from the randomized strategy in some agreements, the different randomized action only
yield the same payoff of the original randomized strategy. In the example of Subsection
2.3, E3 is not S-dominated by Aˆ, but E3 S-dominates E1 and E2. Therefore E3 is the
suggestive dominant equilibrium.
The difference (2) attends to (3), i.e., it guarantees Dominated types. If there is no
dominated types, then the notion of ‘domination’ does not make sense. By the difference
(2), we assure that the Sender at some type gets the strictly higher expected payoff.
Consequently, the suggestive dominant equilibrium is defined as a maximal element of the
suggestive domination. Then we do not need the consistent partition and can avoid the
partial adoption of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set.
Finally, by the difference (1), we intend to gather redundant dominated massages. To
understand this, we consider Example 2.3 again. Look at the agreement E1, and con-
sider the modified agreement of E1 as follows: E′1 = (σ′1, α1, pi) with σ′1(m1|t) = x and
σ′1(m7|t) = 1 − x for any x ∈ (0, 1) and any t ∈ T . This agreement is replacing σ1 of E1
and is also CP/R-trumped by Aˆ at m1 and m7. The message m7 is apparently redundant.
By the definition of the set of messages, we gather such redundant messages. Indeed, E′1 is
S-dominated by Aˆ at neither m1 nor m7 but at {m1,m7}. In the trumping relations, this
problem does not arise. This is because the CP/R-trumping relations care not Dominated
case but only Non-dominated case.
3.3. Efficiency of S-dominant equilibrium messages. The suggestive dominant equi-
librium is a maximal element which is not S-dominated by any agreements at any message.
Therefore the Sender follows the equilibrium agreement even when he has an additional
communication, in which sense the equilibrium is stable. We also show below that the
suggestive domination achieves a Pareto improvement. Therefore the agreement of the
equilibrium is suggestive for the Receiver.
This fact is also shown in the trumping relations. However, as the trumping relations
are not monotonic due to the consistent partitions, it is not very meaningful. In our case,
it is very meaningful because the suggestive domination is monotonic and the equilibrium
is defined as a maximal element of the domination.
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Let us consider again two agreements A,A′ such that A = (σ, α, pi) is S-dominated by
A′ = (σ′, α′, p′) at M∗. We also consider the other agreement A∗ as constructed in the
sketch of Main theorem. Then the following proposition guarantees the higher or equal
expected payoff for the Receiver as follows:
Proposition 3.4. The constructed agreement A∗ = (σ∗, α∗, pi) achieves a weakly Pareto
improvement.
Proof. For the Sender, it is obvious by the condition (II) of S-dominant strategies.
Therefore we consider the Receiver’s expected payoff.
Since (σ′, α′, p′) a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the Receiver’s expected payoff holds the
following inequality: For any m,m∗ ∈M∗,∑
t∈T
p′(t)σ′(m|t)
∑
a∈A
α′(a|m)uR(a, t) ≥
∑
t∈T
p′(t)σ′(m|t)
∑
a∈A
α(a|m∗)uR(a, t).
We apply the condition (I) on p′, divide by
∑
s∈T pi(s)σ(m|s), and obtain the following
from the above inequality: For any m,m∗ ∈M∗,∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ(m∗|t)σ′(m|t)
∑
a∈A
α′(a|m)uR(a, t)
≥
∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ(m∗|t)σ′(m|t)
∑
a∈A
α(a|m∗)uR(a, t). (5)
By summing the above (5) on m∗ ∈M∗ and m ∈M(σ′, p′) with
∑
m∈M(σ′,p′)
σ′(m|t) = 1, we
have
UR(σ∗, α∗) =
∑
t∈T
pi(t)
∑
m∗∈M∗
σ(m∗|t)
∑
m∈M(σ′,p′)
σ′(m|t)
∑
a∈A
α′(a|m)uR(a, t)
≥
∑
t∈T
pi(t)
∑
m∗∈M∗
σ(m∗|t)
∑
m∈M(σ′,p′)
σ′(m|t)
∑
a∈A
α(a|m∗)uR(a, t)
= UR(σ, α).
Then the inequality is held for any α ∈ ∆(A) because (σ′, α′) is a Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium given p′. ¤
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have pointed out the weaknesses of Blume-Sobel’s stability concept
and have improved them. The weaknesses are the partial adoption of von Neumann-
Morgenstern’s stables set and the incoherency of the Receiver’s belief in an additional
communication. These weaknesses bring the unstable agreement and the difficulty of
Pareto improvement, which is discussed in Subsection 3.3.
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In order to improve these weaknesses, we have proposed the suggestive domination and
have defined the suggestive dominant equilibrium. The main point of our improvement
is the stronger requirement of the credibility for the Sender’s message in his randomized
strategy. As a result, our domination concept does not need the consistent partition but
forms a monotonic relation. Therefore the dominated equilibrium is improved by another
equilibrium in the sense of Pareto.
Furthermore, we have shown the procedure to construct a dominating agreement. By
the construction, we only consider the agreement S-dominating Bayesian Nash equilibria.
Appendix
Proof of Main Theorem. Recall a notation in the sketch of the Main theorem: For any
p ∈ ∆T and σ : T → ∆M , we set
M(σ, p) :=
{
m ∈M
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
t∈T
p(t)σ(m|t) > 0
}
.
Consider an agreement A = (σ, α, pi). If this agreement is not S-dominated any agree-
ment, then it is a suggestive dominant equilibrium. If not, there is another agreement
A′ = (σ′, α′, p′) such that A is S-dominated by A′ at M∗ ⊂ M(σ, pi) . We assume
M(σ, pi) ∩M(σ′, p′) without loss of generality. Then we consider the other pair of proba-
bility distributions A∗ = (σ∗, α∗, pi) constructed as follows: For each t ∈ T ,
σ∗(m| t) =

σ′(m| t)
∑
m∗∈M∗
σ(m∗| t) if m ∈M(σ′, p′)
0 if m ∈M∗
σ(m| t) otherwise;
α∗(m) =
{
α′(m) if m ∈M(σ′, p′)
α(m) otherwise.
First of all, this constructed pair A∗ is guaranteed to be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
as follows:
Proposition 4.1. A∗ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We first show that the Sender’s strategy σ∗ is the best response to α∗. For a
type t ∈ T and a message m ∈M with σ∗(m|t) > 0, we suppose that there exists another
message mˆ ∈M with mˆ 6= m such that∑
a∈A
α∗(a| m)uS(a, t) <
∑
a∈A
α∗(a| mˆ)uS(a, t). (6)
Then we have four cases; (i) m, mˆ ∈ M(σ′, p′), (ii) m ∈ M(σ′, p′), mˆ /∈ M(σ′, p′), (iii)
m /∈M(σ′, p′), mˆ ∈M(σ′, p′), and (iv) m, mˆ /∈M(σ′, p′).
15
(i) m, mˆ ∈M(σ′, p′):
As A′ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium given p′,
∑
a∈A
α∗(a| m)uS(a, t) =
∑
a∈A
α′(a| m)uS(a, t)
≥
∑
a∈A
α′(a| mˆ)uS(a, t)
=
∑
a∈A
α∗(a| mˆ)uS(a, t),
in contradiction to (6).
(ii) m ∈M(σ′, p′) and mˆ /∈M(σ′, p′):
Note that σ∗(m| t) = σ′(m| t)∑m∗∈M∗ σ(m∗| t) > 0 because of m ∈ M(σ′, p′).
Since A is S-dominated by A at m∗ ∈M∗,
∑
a∈A
α∗(a| m)uS(a, t) =
∑
a∈A
α′(a| m)uS(a, t)
= US(σ′, α′| t)
≥ US(σ, α| t)
≥
∑
a∈A
α(a| mˆ)uS(a, t)
=
∑
a∈A
α∗(a| mˆ)uS(a, t),
in contradiction to (6).
(iii) m /∈M(σ′, p′) and mˆ ∈M(σ′, p′):
Note that
∑
m∗∈M∗
σ(m∗| t) < 1 for each t ∈ T . This is because, if
∑
m∗∈M∗
σ(m∗| t) =
1, it contradicts the first supposition that σ∗(m| t) = σ(m| t) > 0. Since A is
S-dominated by A′ at m∗ ∈M∗ with σ(m∗| t) < 1 at each t ∈ T ,
∑
a∈A
α∗(a| m)uS(a, t) =
∑
a∈A
α(a| m)uS(a, t)
= US(σ, α| t)
≥
∑
a∈A
α′(a| mˆ)uS(a, t)
=
∑
a∈A
α∗(a| mˆ)uS(a, t)
by (III) of the S-domination, in contradiction to (6).
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(iv) m, mˆ /∈M(σ′, p′):
Since (σ, α) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
∑
a∈A
α∗(a| m)uS(a, t) =
∑
a∈A
α(a| m)uS(a, t)
≥
∑
a∈A
α(a| mˆ)uS(a, t)
=
∑
a∈A
α∗(a| mˆ)uS(a, t),
in contradiction to (6).
Secondly we show that α∗ is the best response to σ∗. In the same way, we suppose that,
for a message m and an action a with α∗(a| m) > 0, there is another action aˆ ∈ A such
that ∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ∗(m| t)uR(a, t) <
∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ∗(m| t)uR(aˆ, t). (7)
Then we have three cases: (i) m ∈M(σ′, p′), (ii) m ∈M∗, and (iii) m /∈M(σ′, p′).
(i) m ∈M(σ′, p′):
We have pi(t)σ(m∗| t) = p′(t)∑s∈T pi(s)σ(m∗| s) by (I) of Definition 3.1. Then,
by summing on M∗, we obtain
pi(t)
∑
m∗∈M∗
σ(m∗| t) = p′(t)
∑
s∈T
∑
m∗∈M∗
pi(s)σ(m∗| s)
. Since A′ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium given p′,
∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ∗(m| t)uR(a, t) =
∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ′(m| t)
∑
m∗∈M∗
σ(m∗| t)uR(a, t)
=
∑
t∈T
p′(t)σ′(m| t)uR(a, t)
∑
s∈T
∑
m∗∈M∗
pi(s)σ(m∗| s)
≥
∑
t∈T
p′(t)σ′(m| t)uR(aˆ, t)
∑
s∈T
∑
m∗∈M∗
pi(s)σ(m∗| s)
=
∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ∗(m| t)uR(aˆ, t),
in contradiction to (7).
(ii) m ∈M∗:
From the construction of σ∗ at m ∈M∗, we obtain the same value, zero, for both
the left-hand and right-hand sides of (7), in contradiction.
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(iii) m 6∈M∗ ∪M(σ′, p′):
As A is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium,∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ∗(m| t)uR(a, t) =
∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ(m| t)uR(a, t)
≥
∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ(m| t)uR(aˆ, t)
=
∑
t∈T
pi(t)σ∗(m| t)uR(aˆ, t),
in contradiction to (7).
¤
We have proved that the constructed agreement is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In
the next step, we show the following proposition that the constructed agreement is not
S-dominated by the agreement S-dominating A:
Proposition 4.2. A∗ is not S-dominated by A′ at any message.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. If A∗ is S-dominated by A′, from the condition (II) of
the S-domination, there exists t ∈ T with σ(m∗|t) > 0 for any m∗ ∈M∗ such that
US(σ∗, α∗|t) < US(σ′, α′|t). (8)
Note that the construction of (σ∗, α∗) leads
US(σ∗, α∗|t) =
∑
m∗∈M∗
σ(m∗|t)US(σ′, α′|t)
+{1−
∑
m∗∈M∗
σ(m∗|t)}US(σ, α|t) (9)
for all t ∈ T . Then, from the condition (III) of the S-domination between A and A′, we
have
US(σ, α|t) ≥ max
mˆ∈M
∑
a∈A
α′(a|mˆ)uS(a, t) = US(σ′, α′|t)
in the case of
∑
m∗∈M∗ σ(m
∗|t) < 1. This contradicts (8) because of (9). ¤
To complete the proof of Main theorem, we consider the case that the constructed
agreement A∗ is S-dominated by another agreement at some message. Then we construct
the other agreement E∗ from A∗. It is guaranteed to stop this repetitive construction in
a finite step because of the finiteness of the equilibrium outcome shown by Park [5].
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